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Maritime port infrastructures rely on the use of information systems for collaboration, while a vital part of collab- 
orating is to provide protection to these systems. Attack graph analysis and risk assessment provide information 
that can be used to protect the assets of a network from cyber-attacks. Furthermore, attack graphs provide func- 
tionality that can be used to identify vulnerabilities in a network and how these can be exploited by potential 
attackers. Existing attack graph generation methods are inadequate in satisfying certain requirements necessary 
in a dynamic supply chain risk management environment, since they do not consider variables that assist in ex- 
ploring speciﬁc network parts that satisfy certain criteria, such as the entry and target points, the propagation 
length and the location and capability of the potential attacker. In this paper, we present a cyber-attack path dis- 
covery method that is used as a component of a maritime risk management system. The method uses constraints 
and Depth-ﬁrst search to eﬀectively generate attack graphs that the administrator is interested in. To support our 
method and to show its eﬀectiveness we have evaluated it using real data from a maritime supply chain. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
1
 
e  
s  
n  
m  
c  
C  
i  
m  
l  
t  
i  
c  
I  
t  
c  
o  
m  
a  
r  
c  
n  
t  
d  
n  
r  
t  
a  
m  
a  
a  
B  
b
1
 
r  
a  
1 The acronym MITIGATE stands for Multidimensional, integrated, risk assessment 
framework and dynamic, collaborative Risk Management tools for critical information 
infrastructures and is a collaborative research project co-funded by the European Com- 
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0. Introduction 
Modern port infrastructures, tend to be highly dependent on the op-
ration of complex, dynamic IT-based maritime supply chains. Maritime
upply chains comprise globally distributed, interconnected set of orga-
izations that involve numerous entities, including other Critical Infor-
ation Infrastructures (CIIs); such as transport, energy, telecommuni-
ation and cyber networks. This emerging landscape of IT-empowered
IIs-based critical infrastructures requires a paradigm shift in the way
t assesses risks and vulnerabilities, as most existing risk management
ethodologies are overly focused on physical-security aspects and pay
imited attention to CIIs, remaining oblivious to the complex nature of
he IT systems and assets used in the maritime sector, along with their
nterrelationships and do not adequately take into account security pro-
esses associated with international supply chains, which are nowadays
T enabled and therefore severely dependent on intentional and unin-
entional compromise of CIIs. Hence, in a dynamic environment where
onstant hardware and software changes take place in diﬀerent parts
f the supply chain IT infrastructure, there is a need for rethinking risk
anagement in the maritime sector by addressing the role of port CIIs
nd their impact on maritime supply chains, since in a dynamic envi-
onment CIIs that include both hardware and software assets constantly
hange and existing risk management systems fail to address speciﬁc∗ Corresponding author. 
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920-5489/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article undeetwork aspects such as entry and target points, propagation length and
he location and capability of a potential attacker. In this direction, we
eveloped, a risk management system, called MITIGATE 1 , for the dy-
amic nature of supply maritime chain IT infrastructure. To perform
igorous risk assessments in MITIGATE, it is necessary to identify po-
ential cyber-attacks by constructing the attack graph and performing
nalysis to identify attack paths [1,2] . In the context of risk manage-
ent, attack path discovery is important to perform risk assessments
nd mitigations [2,3] . Attack path discovery is important to identify the
ttack paths that potential attackers might follow to exploit a network.
y identifying the necessary paths, the mitigation of potential threats
ecome more eﬀective. 
.1. Problem deﬁnition and contributions 
In the maritime supply chain management, it is necessary to perform
isk assessments at regular intervals to identify the possibility of cyber-
ttacks that might occur in the future. Attack path discovery methods, Pavlidis), H.Mouratidis@Brighton.ac.uk (H. Mouratidis). 
issions under its biggest Research and Innovation program Horizon 2020. 
r the CC BY-NC-ND license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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a  uch as MulVAL, TVA or NuSMV [4–6] , can be used to identify attack
aths within a network and then, these paths can be used within a risk
anagement system to perform risk assessments and oﬀer potential mit-
gation solutions. In the literature, several approaches [2–14] can be
ound that oﬀer attack graph generation and analysis solutions. How-
ver, in most, if not all, assessment scenarios, it is not necessary to
dentify all possible paths within a network, since only certain parts
f it typically change in a given period, and usually a risk assessment
s performed in speciﬁc network parts. In a dynamic environment, it is
ecessary for managers to be able to identify possible attack paths that
atisfy certain constraints, such as the potential location and capability
f an attacker, the entry and target points and the propagation length.
xisting approaches do not output the most probable paths but rather
ll network paths resulting in slower analysis times and duplication of
nalysis. Moreover, the literature fails to provide evaluations of the ex-
sting work based on maritime supply chains. Thus, to ﬁll the gap, we
eliver: 
• A highly parameterized cyber-attack path discovery method that
works within a dynamic risk management system to detect the vul-
nerabilities of the IT infrastructure and to deliver attack paths that
satisfy certain criteria. The proposed parameterized method discov-
ers paths in certain network parts, thus making risk assessment spe-
ciﬁc and faster. 
• Extensive evaluation based on synthetic and real data from the
maritime supply chain management sector, show that the proposed
method performs as well under diﬀerent scenarios. 
.2. Paper structure 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains
he relevant background. Section 3 presents the proposed method.
ection 4 explains the experimental evaluation and Section 5 contains
he discussion and Section 6 the conclusions and future work parts. 
. Background 
.1. MITIGATE 
MITIGATE is an EU funded project that has a consortium of 12 part-
ers with scientiﬁc and industrial background in the maritime port do-
ain. The main goal of MITIGATE is to realize a radical shift in risk
anagement methodologies for the maritime sector toward a collabo-
ative evidence-driven maritime supply chain risk assessment approach
hat alleviates the limitations of state-of-the-art risk management frame-
orks. The MITIGATE risk assessment methodology is directly appli-
able to maritime supply chains, but is not limited to this business
ector. The methodology provides a holistic view of the IT infrastruc-
ure required for spanning across business partners and organizational
oundaries, to identify and evaluate all cyber threats and risks within
he supply chain. MITIGATE promotes collaboration between business
artners and considers the involvement and importance of the business
artners to identify the vulnerabilities, develop an attack path discovery
ethod, perform risk assessments and provide potential mitigation so-
utions. The attack path discovery method is a link between the vulner-
bilities and their mitigation, since it identiﬁes all paths that satisfy the
equested criteria. The identiﬁed paths are then used for risk assessment
nd mitigation. In addition, MITIGATE is a standards-based risk man-
gement system. In the context of MITIGATE standardization guidance
as been followed throughout the development of the platform. Further-
ore, the use of standards in risk management has been identiﬁed and
ollowed in previous related works [15,16] . In MITAGE guidance from
he ISO and NIST standards was applied to deliver a complete platform
hat identiﬁes relevant attack paths, performs risk assessments and pro-
ides migration solutions. Although, discovery of attack paths can be
ade without standardization procedures, standards assist in platform75 evelopment by providing guidance that ranges from requirements to
mplementation. The methodology by design is compliant with inter-
ational standards (from the ISO27K and ISO28K families) and capi-
alizes on them and other well-known and proved guidelines and good
ractices (NIST SP800-30), following standardized notations. In addi-
ion, it is implementable, adopting a sequential step-by-step process with
lear inputs and outcomes. Standard compliance ranges from manage-
ent system speciﬁcation guidelines (ISO 28000:2007), guidance for
mplementation (28001:2007), risk management process and activities
27005:2011), establishment, implementation, monitoring and review,
aintenance and improvement of an Information Security Management
ystem (27001:2013) and guidelines and general principles for initi-
ting, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security
anagement in an organization (27002:2013). Finally, the attacker pro-
ling, as suggested by NIST SP800-30, has been used as a basis for the
haracterization of an attacker in the risk management system. The qual-
tative scale of which is ranging from “Low ” to “Medium ” to “High ”. 
.2. Related work in attack graph analysis 
In attack graph generation and analysis several approaches can be
ound in the literature. Typically graph construction takes place within
 network to identify all possible attacks paths that can be exploited by
ttackers to gain unauthorized access to the system [17] . For instance,
ulVal is a well-established enterprise network security analyzer that
s based on logic [4] . It models software bug interactions along with
etwork conﬁguration, with data supplied by an open source reporting
ommunity. Another tool for generating attack graphs can be found in
5] with the name TVA. This is a tool for topological network analy-
is based on graph dependency exploitation. In [7] the authors propose
he use of a general graph model that is based on a speciﬁcation lan-
uage proposed by them. Then they create sample attack scenarios using
iﬀerent methods such as substitution, looping and distribution tech-
iques. In [8] the authors implemented an intrusion detection system
hat produces a graph as output. Another approach is the one found in
9] that uses model checking to analyze a network and ﬁnd vulnerabili-
ies. NuSMV [6] is another model checking tool that ﬁnds vulnerabilities
nd generates an attack graph. The work proposed by Xinming Ou and-
oyer [10] is yet another logic based approach that uses deduction to
orm the attack graph. 
Solutions that are closer to our method exist, with one found in
6] that uses a Breadth-ﬁrst search method to identify the vulnerabil-
ties and build the attack graph. Another similar method is [11] that
ntroduces the concept of group reachability to reduce graph complex-
ty based on Breadth-ﬁrst search. Furthermore, more recent approaches
xist and oﬀer diﬀerent solutions to generate attack graphs. In [12] the
uthors propose a distributed approach to attack graph generation. This
ethod is based on a multi-agent system, a virtual shared memory ab-
traction and hyper graph portioning to improve the performance. This
ethod uses a Depth-ﬁrst search method and the performance is im-
roved with the use of multiple agents after a speciﬁc network size. It
s also shown that in small network sizes a single threaded approach
s faster. In [13] the authors propose the use of a dynamic algorithm
hat generates an attack graph consisting of the top K paths that there
s a probability of being exploited. Also in [3] an approach used ex-
lusively in dynamic risk management is found. This approach uses a
ayesian-based attack graph generation method. Another approach for
ttack graph generation for risk assessment is the one proposed by Lee
t al. [2] . This method provides scalability and is based on a cut and di-
ide method and a series of division rounds and uses Depth-ﬁrst search
o search the smaller graphs. Yet another approach is described in [14] ,
here the authors exploit risk ﬂow within an attack graph for perform-
ng security risk assessment. 
In the literature, there are speciﬁcally tailored methods for risk man-
gement and most of the network analysis methods can be used for that
fter speciﬁc conﬁguration. Table 1 provides a list of the relevant related
N. Polatidis et al. Computer Standards & Interfaces 56 (2018) 74–82 
Table 1 
Method features. 
Method Brief description 
Ref. [2] • Risk management 
• Cut and divide based on division rounds 
• Depth-ﬁrst search 
Ref. [3] • Risk management 
• Bayesian based attack graph generation 
Ref. [4] • Network analysis 
• Logic based 
Ref. [5] • Network analysis 
• Graph dependency 
Ref. [6] • Model checking 
• Find vulnerabilities and generate graph 
Ref. [7] • Network analysis 
• Sample attacks 
Ref. [8] • Intrusion detection 
• Graph construction 
Ref. [9] • Model checking 
• Find vulnerabilities and generate graph 
Ref. [10] • Network analysis 
• Logic based 
Ref. [11] • Breadth-ﬁrst search 
• Group reachability 
Ref. [12] • Depth-ﬁrst search 
• Distributed computation 
Ref. [13] • Dynamic 
• Top K paths 
Ref. [14] • Risk management 
• Depth-ﬁrst search 
• Risk ﬂow within graph 
w  
e  
m
3
 
t  
m  
t  
i  
s  
m  
t  
S
 
w  
b  
o  
w  
t  
o  
r  
d  
f  
v  
c  
a  
b  
t  
t  
t  
o  
t  
h  
c  
g  
a  
c
 
 
 
 
 
f  
a  
m  
a  
m  
t  
c  
a  
u  
m  
o  
r
3
 
t  
c
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the web interface. orks and gives a brief description of each. In the ﬁrst column, the ref-
rence of each relevant work is listed, whereas in the second column the
ain characteristics of each method are listed. 
. Attack path discovery in MITIGATE 
An attack path is the identiﬁcation of one or more vulnerabilities
hat can be exploited by attackers to gain access to speciﬁc assets and
ove between them in a network, thus, forming an exploitable path be-
ween the assets. The main goal of the attack path discovery method is to
dentify the attack paths in speciﬁed network fragments of the maritime
upply chain infrastructure and use them in MITIGATE for risk manage-
ent. Furthermore, the attack path discovery method is comprised of
he following main components, that the related works mentioned in
ection 2 fail to address as a whole: 
1 Capability and location of the attacker. 
2 Max length. 
3 Propagation length. 
4 Entry and target points. 
The capability of the attacker could be either low, medium or high,
hile the location of the attacker could be local, adjacent or network
ased. The max length and the propagation length specify the depth
f the graph that will be searched. The entry and target points specify
hich are the entry points that we want to assess and which are the
arget points. MITIGATE considers a supply chain being the linked set
f resources and processes that begins with the sourcing of raw mate-
ial and extends through the manufacturing, processing, handling and
elivery of goods, products and/or services to the consumer through dif-
erent transport means and that a supply chain service is a service pro-
ided and/or supported by a supply chain. Thus, supply chain service
yber threats indicate how a potential security incident might occur,
ﬀecting a speciﬁc cyber asset. Furthermore, we deﬁne a vulnerability
eing a weakness or a ﬂaw in an asset, raised either from implementa-
ion, design, or other processes that can be exploited or triggered by a
hreat, an attacker being a person or independently executing program
hat intends to compromise the conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availability76 f an asset and an attack being a set of actions that an attacker performs
o exploit a vulnerability. Furthermore, the following general guidelines
ave been followed in the design, development and testing, after careful
onsideration and requirement analysis. The following guidelines are a
eneral model resulted after the requirement analysis. The guidelines
re important since they give a general overview of what the method
onsiders and implements. 
1 We consider only cyber threats that can occur from malicious at-
tempts to gain unauthorized access to a network or system. 
2 We model the supply chain service as a one-way directed graph and
consider only independent attacks and not cyclic attacks. 
3 We map the main threat categories to speciﬁc vulnerability cate-
gories. 
4 We use the open NIST national vulnerability repository (although
one may use any other open repository). 
MITIGATE, as a risk management system needs to take as input in-
ormation such as the attacker’s capability and location, the propagation
nd max length and the entry and target assets. This is done by the ad-
inistrator of the system when running various tests to ﬁnd risks in
 network. MITIGATE, consists of a web interface that the system ad-
inistrator uses to perform diﬀerent tasks, including attack path iden-
iﬁcation. In a dynamic environment, where changes are being made
onstantly an administrator might want to perform risk assessments for
 speciﬁc network part, thus using the web interface she will enter man-
ally the location and capability of the attacker, the propagation and
ax length and the entry and target assets to perform diﬀerent types
f risk assessments under diﬀerent settings to have a broad view of the
isks. 
.1. Proposed method 
According to the deﬁnitions, the attacker proﬁle, the attacker loca-
ion and the association rules the algorithm executes a series of steps to
onstruct the attack graph and identify the paths. 
The steps are: 
Step 1. Load the data from the graph database and store it in a graph
data structure. 
• In both cases that the tool is used as standalone or as a compo-
nent of MITIGATE the database details, such as the username,
password and connection details need to be present in the source
code of the system. 
Step 2. Load the capability and location. 
• If the method is used as standalone these data need to be entered
manually in the source code. In the case that the tool is used
within the MITIGATE platform then these are entered through
the web interface. 
Step 3. Delete all the assets from the graph that the attacker does
not have the capability or location level required. 
• If the attacker does not have the capability or the required loca-
tion status then assets that are do not fall into this category are
removed from the ﬁnal graph. 
Step 4. Specify the max and propagation lengths and delete all the
assets that are not within the lengths. 
• If the method is used as standalone these data need to be entered
manually in the source code. In the case that the tool is used
within the MITIGATE platform then these are entered through
N. Polatidis et al. Computer Standards & Interfaces 56 (2018) 74–82 
Algorithm 1 
Attack path discovery. 
Input: Asset graph 
Output: Aﬀected assets, attack paths 
# Load the graph and store it in memory 
Load Asset graph from database 
Create Graph data structure G and store the asset graph 
#Load the attacker location and capability 
Load attacker location and capability 
for e in parameters entry points 
If attacker location < required level of attacker location OR attacker capability < required attacker capability 
return empty graph 
else 
get single source shortest path length 
#Set the maximum and propagation lengths 
set max and propagation length 
for entry point e 
for target point t 
#Create a list with all non-circular paths from entry e to target t 
#Search the graph up to the speciﬁed length 
get all paths in the graph G from entry e to target t that are up to the pre-speciﬁed path length 
for the size of paths found 
add paths to attackpaths [] list 
add aﬀected assets to aﬀectedassets [] list 
return attack paths, aﬀected assets 
Table 2 
Attacker capability. 
Qualitative values Description 
High The attacker is an expert and has the suﬃcient resources to perform an attack. 
Medium The expertise and the resources of the attacker are of a moderate level. 
Low The attacker has limited resources and expertise to perform a successful attack. 
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l  Step 5. Specify which the entry and target assets are. 
• If the method is used as standalone these data need to be entered
manually in the source code. In the case that the tool is used
within the MITIGATE platform then these are entered through
the web interface. 
Step 6. Create a new graph containing all the remaining assets ac-
cording to the above steps. 
• The ﬁnal graph is loaded into memory using a graph data struc-
ture. 
Step 7. Use Depth-ﬁrst search to identify all non-circular attack paths
in the newly formed graph. 
• Depth-ﬁrst can be eﬃciently used to identify the attack paths. 
The pseudocode of the method is shown in Algorithm 1 . 
.2. Attacker proﬁle and location 
This section describes the proﬁle and location of an attacker. The
ain attacker proﬁle is identiﬁed based on their capability, knowledge
nd expertise in coordinating, executing and succeeding an attack. The
haracteristics are based on the NIST SP800-30 guide but only utilized
hree levels of expertise. Table 2 provides the characteristics of the at-
acker’s capability. Furthermore, the attacker could be an “inside ” or
outside ” attacker. The location will inﬂuence which assets will be po-
ential entry points. Table 3 provides the characteristics of the attacker’s
ocation. 
In attack path discovery is important to be able to use the proﬁle
nd location of the attacker. The identiﬁed vulnerabilities found in cy-
er systems can be exploited by attackers possessing a certain level of
xpertise and by their location in the system. All the information about
he expertise and the location of an attacker should be available for risk
dentiﬁcation and mitigation, since certain types of vulnerabilities need
o be prioritized according to the current defence strategy. 77 .3. Rules 
Attack path identiﬁcation follows certain rules that belong to two
iﬀerent phases. The ﬁrst phase is the knowledge base of the system and
emains constant unless changes in the assets or in their connections are
ade. Moreover, the second phase is the path construction phase which
ollows a set of rules as well. 
Phase 1: Knowledge base 
Rule 1. Assets connected using a symmetric relationship. 
∀asset1,asset2 Connected(aseet1,aseet2) ⇔ Con- 
nected(asset2,asset1). 
Rule 2. Assets connected using a common network. 
∀asset1,asset2,net ConnectsTo(asset1,net) ∧ConnectsTo(asset2,ne
⇒ Connected(asset1,asset2) ∧Connected(asset2,asset1). 
Rule 3. Assets connected to vulnerabilities using a symmetric rela-
tionship. 
∀vuln1,vuln2,asset Connected(vuln1,asset,vuln2,asset) ⇒
Connected(vuln2,asset,vuln1,asset2) 
Rule 4. Vulnerabilities connected to assets using a symmetric rela-
tionship. 
∀vuln1,vuln2,asset1,asset2 Connected(vuln1,asset1,vuln2, 
asset2) ⇒Connected(vuln2,asset2,vuln1,asset1). 
Rule 5. Exploiting diﬀerent vulnerabilities aﬀecting the same asset.
∀vuln1,vuln2,asset Vulnerability(vuln1,asset) ∧Vulnerability
(vuln2,asset) ⇒Connected(vuln1,asset,vuln2,asset) ∧Connected 
(vuln2,asset,vuln1,asset). 
Rule 6. Relationship between vulnerabilities of connected assets. 
∀vuln1,vuln2,asset1,asset2 Vulnerability(vuln1,asset1) ∧
Vulnerability(vuln2,asset2) ∧Connected(asset1,asset2) ⇒
Connected(vuln1,asset1,vuln2,asset2) ∧Connected(vuln2,asset2, 
vuln1,asset1). 
Phase 2: Path construction 
The second phase is the path construction phase follows rules that be-
ong to the propagation and allow us to determine which vulnerabilities
N. Polatidis et al. Computer Standards & Interfaces 56 (2018) 74–82 
Table 3 
Attacker location. 
Qualitative values Description 
Local The attacker is located within the network. 
Adjacent The attacker is in an adjacent network that currently communicates with the target network. 
Network The attacker is in a wider network such as the Internet. 
Fig. 1. MITIGATE - attack path discovery interface. 
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c  he attacker can use to further penetrate the supply chain infrastructure
o reach a predetermined target or to cause general damage by aﬀecting
s many assets as possible from a given entry point/asset. In their cur-
ent form, the rules don’t construct the whole path but merely indicate
or every connection if it could be used for the propagation of the at-
acker. For convenience, the rules are divided into subgroups. The rules
o discover which vulnerabilities are accessible by the attacker are: 
Rule 1. An existing vulnerability (whether conﬁrmed or a zero-day
one) on an asset is accessible by an attacker if its AV is ‘Network ’
(i.e. remotely exploitable) and both the asset and attacker are
connected to the same network (e.g. the Internet). 
∀vuln,asset,attacker,loc Network(attacker,loc) ∧ConnectsTo
(asset,loc) ∧Vulnerability(vuln,asset) ∧Network(vuln) ⇒Accessible
(vuln,asset,attacker). 
Rule 2. An existing vulnerability on an asset is accessible by an at-
tacker if its AV is ‘Adjacent Network (i.e. exploitable over local
network) and both the asset and attacker are connected to the
same local network. 
∀vuln,asset,attacker,loc AdjacentNetwork(attacker,loc) ∧
ConnectsTo(asset,loc) ∧Vulnerability(vuln,asset) ∧
(AdjacentNetwork(vuln) ∨Network(vuln)) ⇒Accessible(vuln,asset
attacker) 78 Rule 3. An existing vulnerability on an asset is accessible by an at-
tacker if its AV is ‘Local ’ (i.e. requires physical access or local
account) and attacker has physical access or a local account. 
∀vuln,asset,attacker,localAccount Local(attacker,asset) ∨
AccessRight(attacker,localAccount) ∧Vulnerability(vuln,asset) ∧
(Local(vuln) ∨AdjacentNetwork(vuln) ∨Network(vuln)) ⇒
Accessible(vuln,asset,attacker) 
Rule 4. An existing vulnerability on an asset is accessible by an at-
tacker if it can be reached via some other vulnerability on the
system. 
∀uln1,asset1,vuln2,asset2,attacker Traversable(vuln1,asset1,
asset2,attacker) ∨Traversable(vuln,asset1,vuln2,asset2,attacker) 
⇒Accessible(vuln2,asset2,attacker). 
. Experimental evaluation 
To perform the experimental evaluation, we used a Pentium i7 with
2GBs of RAM running windows 10. Furthermore, we developed the
roposed attack path discovery algorithm using Python and Neo4J. The
valuation has been based in two diﬀerent case studies. In the ﬁrst we
ave used synthetic data to give a step by step description to show the
elationships between assets and vulnerabilities and that the algorithm
an identify the relevant attack paths under the speciﬁed settings. In
N. Polatidis et al. Computer Standards & Interfaces 56 (2018) 74–82 
Fig. 2. Case study graph database. 
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p  he second case study, we have used real data about assets, vulnerabili-
ies and relationships supplied by the port of Valencia to show how the
lgorithm performs. Furthermore, the attack path discovery interface
omponent of the MITIGATE system is shown in Fig. 1 . In the ﬁgure,
t is shown that the administrator has the option to enter all the neces-
ary information and by pressing the ‘Discover ’ button the algorithm is
xecuted. 
.1. Case study: synthetic data 
Initially, we developed a case study that is based on seven assets and
ine vulnerabilities. We have used seven assets and nine vulnerabilities
o have at least one asset being vulnerable to one or more vulnerabili-
ies. Moreover, each vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker with
peciﬁc knowledge and location. In the graph in Fig. 2 blue circles repre-
ents assets and green represent the vulnerabilities and the data used for
his part are synthetic. According to our proposed method each asset is
ulnerable to one or more vulnerabilities in this scenario. Furthermore,
he types of relationships between assets and vulnerabilities as set from
he MITIGATE consortium. These are: 
• Communicates with (asset to asset communication). 
• Installed on (asset, app or similar, installed on asset). 
• Vulnerable to (asset is vulnerable to vulnerability). v  
79 In the settings of the proposed method several diﬀerent settings must
e set before the execution of the algorithm. These are: 
• Attacker capability (Low, Medium or High). 
• Attacker location (Local, Adjacent or Network). 
• Propagation length (The length of the propagation). 
• Max length (The max length in the network that an attacker could
go into). 
• Entry points (Which the entry points are). 
• Target points (Which the target points are). 
For the case study and to validate the quality of the algorithm we
ave run three diﬀerent tests: 
Test 1. In this test, we have set the attacker capability to 3 (high),
he location to 1 (local), max length to 2 and propagation length to 2.
dditionally, we have set the entry points as assets 1 and 7 and the
arget points as assets 2 and 5. According to the information form the
ssets, the vulnerabilities, the relationships and the settings used two
aths should be identiﬁed. Subsequently, the following paths have been
dentiﬁed by the algorithm: [1,2,5] . 
Test 2. In this test, we have set the attacker capability to 1 (low),
he location to 2 (adjacent), max length to 2 and propagation length
o 2. Additionally, we have set the entry point as asset 3 and the target
oints as assets 6 and 7. According to the information form the assets, the
ulnerabilities, the relationships and the settings used no paths should
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Table 4 
Synthetic data case study quality results. 
No of test No of present paths No of paths found Paths 
1 2 2 [1, 2, 1, 5] 
2 0 0 [empty list] 
3 1 1 [3, 4, 5, 7] 
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s  
c  e identiﬁed. Subsequently, the algorithms returned the following mes-
age: Attacker cannot exploit entry point: 3 [empty list]. 
Test 3. In this test, we have set the attacker capability to 3 (high),
he location to 2 (adjacent), max length to 3 and propagation length
o 3. Additionally, we have set the entry point as asset 3 and the target
oints as assets 6 and 7. According to the information form the assets, the
ulnerabilities, the relationships and the settings used one path should
e identiﬁed. Subsequently, the following path has been identiﬁed by
he algorithm: [3–5, 7] . 
The output of the three tests of the case study show that the algorithm
dentiﬁes the desired attack paths according to the settings speciﬁed in
he risk management system. At the end, the algorithm returns the paths
r an empty list to clearly show the quality of the result. Table 4 shows
he results of the case study where for each test it is shown how many
aths exist and how many parts the method found. Moreover, in the last
olumn the paths are displayed. 
.2. Case study: the port of Valencia 
Valencia port is a port community system that is located at the port
f Valencia and is managed by the port authority of Valencia. The sys-
em allows actors who are involved in the transportation of goods to
onnect and exchange information. The current information system is
omprised of 26 assets including both hardware and software assets.
sing the information supplied by the port of Valencia we have exe-
uted a series of tests to validate the performance of the attack path
iscovery method, the results of which are presented in Table 5 . In the
able, the propagation length and max length refer to the length that
he respective steps that an attacker could made according to the risk
ssessment scenario. The entry points refer to how many entry points
ave been speciﬁed and the target points refer to the number of target
oints the attacker wants to reach from the entry points. Moreover, it is
an also be speciﬁed which the entry and target points are. Finally, the
umber of paths found is the exact number of attack paths found by the
lgorithm according to the settings uses and the time in seconds is the
xact processing time of the algorithm. 
Furthermore, based on the data from the port of Valencia we devel-
ped a realistic database consisting of 182 assets. The assets include 35
ardware assets, 147 software assets installed evenly on the hardware
ssets and vulnerabilities associated to various software assets. Then fur-
her associations have been made to form a network between the hard-
are assets. The supplementary performance results based on the 182
ssets are presented in Fig. 3 . On the left part of the ﬁgure from 0 to 5
he seconds are represented, the terms low, medium and high represent
he capability of the attacker and in all cases the location of the attacker
as been set to local. Additionally, the values 5, 10, 20, and 50 repre-
ent both the number of the entry and target points. Lastly, the max and
ropagation length values have been both set to 10 in all cases. 
. Discussion 
The proposed method is tailored to dynamic risk management for
raph construction and analysis. This takes place within MITIGATE and
lthough it takes features from methods found in the literature it pro-
ides unique characteristics [2,3,12,14] . When comparing the proposed
ethod with other methods we can easily identify the main similarities
s shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 6 and the unique diﬀerences in80 he second column of Table 6 . Both the similarities, but more impor-
antly, the diﬀerences are a central part of attack path identiﬁcation in
ynamic supply chain environments. In a dynamic environment, there
re small but constant changes of hardware and software assets within
he network. Thus, it is important for risk management to be able to
ave options such as the entry and target points to be able to perform
ssessments in various network parts as these are constantly changed or
pdated. 
Attack path discovery is a major link between components in risk
anagement systems [2,14] . Cyber-attacks can be mitigated using the
iscovered attack paths for risk assessment and by oﬀering potential
itigation solutions. In MITIGATE the proposed attack path discovery
ethod diﬀers from the ones proposed in the literature since it can be ef-
ectively used to ﬁnd attack paths from speciﬁc entry points that aim to
ttack speciﬁc target points, take into consideration characteristics such
s the location and the capability of the attacker and the propagation
ength. Methods for attack paths identiﬁcation used for risk assessment
uch as [2,3,14] do not take into consideration all these characteristics
nd are not suitable for the supply chain management of the maritime
omain. Although, other network-based methods could be used such as
4–6] , these would not give the optimum outcome since many modiﬁ-
ations will be necessary for those to work in MITIGATE. Thus, the pro-
osed method provides speciﬁc graph generation that contains certain
ssets within a speciﬁc network part, which leads to risk management
n speciﬁc network parts. The maritime supply chain management is a
ynamic environment constantly, where several parts form the supply
hain. In the IT infrastructure of the supply chain only certain software
r hardware assets will typically change within a given period. The main
iﬀerence of the proposed attack path discovery algorithm is the genera-
ion of speciﬁc attacks graphs that contains only portions of the network,
hich leads to smaller graphs and smaller search spaces. Additionally,
t has been discussed before that pure Depth-ﬁrst search is more eﬃ-
ient in smaller search spaces when compared to alternatives such as
istributed technologies [12] . Our method assists in risk management
y providing attack paths for the speciﬁed assets and characteristics,
lthough it can still be used to provide all attacks paths. Additionally,
isk management in dynamic environments requires the use of a highly-
arameterized attack path discovery algorithm due to its dynamic
ature. In the maritime supply chain domain MITIGATE oﬀers a solu-
ion to risk management due to its suitability for this speciﬁc domain.
ur attack path discovery method complements MITIGATE by integrat-
ng with the system and discovering attack paths between assets that
atisfy certain requirements. An administrator of the system could enter
r update the data in the database and then check speciﬁc parts of the
ystem for vulnerability exploitation, without the need of checking the
hole network. 
To show that our proposed method is both practical, eﬀective and
uitable for its purpose we have conducted two case studies. In the ﬁrst
ase study, we have used a small amount of synthetic data to show how
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Table 5 
Port of Valencia case study performance results. 
No. of test Attacker capability Attacker location Propagation length Max length No. of entry points No. of target points Time in seconds 
1 Low Local 3 3 2 2 1.27 
2 Low Local 3 3 3 3 1.65 
3 Low Adjacent 3 3 2 2 0.95 
4 Low Adjacent 3 3 3 3 0.97 
5 Low Network 3 3 2 2 0.90 
6 Low Network 3 3 3 3 0.82 
7 Medium Local 4 4 2 2 0.94 
8 Medium Local 4 4 3 3 0.98 
9 Medium Adjacent 4 4 2 2 0.90 
10 Medium Adjacent 4 4 3 3 0.81 
11 Medium Network 4 4 2 2 0.90 
12 Medium Network 4 4 3 3 1.07 
13 High Local 5 5 4 4 0.81 
14 High Local 5 5 5 5 0.94 
15 High Adjacent 5 5 4 4 0.92 
16 High Adjacent 5 5 5 5 1.10 
17 High Network 5 5 4 4 1.10 
18 High Network 5 5 5 5 1.10 
19 High Local 3 3 26 26 1.35 
20 High Local 4 4 26 26 1.60 
21 High Adjacent 3 3 26 26 1.31 
22 High Adjacent 4 4 26 26 1.33 
23 High Network 3 3 26 26 1.42 
24 High Network 4 4 26 26 1.36 
25 High Local 8 8 26 26 1.92 
26 High Local 10 10 26 26 1.95 
27 High Adjacent 8 8 26 26 1.65 
28 High Adjacent 10 10 26 26 1.93 
29 High Network 8 8 26 26 1.52 
30 High Network 10 10 26 26 1.64 
Table 6 
Method similarities and diﬀerences. 
Similarities between our method and others Diﬀerences between our method and others 
1. Takes as input speciﬁc entry points and target points. 
1. Developed with risk management in mind. 2. Takes as input the capability of the attacker. 
2. Attack path generation based on attack graph input. 3. Takes as input the location of the attacker. 
3. Based on depth-ﬁrst search. 4. The maximum and propagation lengths are speciﬁed. 
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c  he assets and vulnerabilities are related within the graph database, to
xplain step by step how the algorithm works and to show that the algo-
ithm identiﬁes existing attack paths under the speciﬁed settings. In this
ase study, we conducted three diﬀerent tests with random choosing of
ntry points, target points and propagation length. Table 4 presents the
esults of the case study, where it is shown that the number of present
ttack paths under the speciﬁed settings are identiﬁed by the proposed
ethod. For the second case study, we have used real data from the
ort of Valencia. It is shown that with 26 assets the algorithm performs
ell and achieves its accomplishment in about 1 s. Although, it starts
rom 0.7 second it grows larger than 1 s as the network settings change
nd the algorithm searches through more nodes. Although, it should
e noted that depending on the relationships between assets and vul-
erabilities the processing time will vary. In our experiments, we have
elected random combinations from the data supplied by the port of Va-
encia regarding which the entry and target points are. Diﬀerent com-
inations of entry and target points will result to diﬀerent outputs and
iﬀerent processing times. However, the point of the algorithm is indeed
o search diﬀerent combinations as these are speciﬁed by the adminis-
rator of MITIGATE for speciﬁc network parts within the supply chain
aritime domain. In this domain, parts of hardware and software are
onstantly added, removed or updated and risk assessments need to take
lace for speciﬁc network domains. Additionally, this should happen
ithin a reasonable amount of time. The results from the second case
tudy are presented in Table 5 and show how the method performs under
iﬀerent settings. However, the processing time could vary depending
d  
81 n how many entry and target points have been speciﬁed, which these
oints are and the propagation and max length. 
We have shown that our proposed cyber-attack path discovery
ethod is both practical and eﬀective. It can identify relevant attack
aths under speciﬁed conditions and contribute to risk management.
t is vital in dynamic maritime supply chain maritime environments to
rovide a method that discovers attack paths for speciﬁc part in an eﬀec-
ive and eﬃcient way. As part of the MITIGATE risk management system
ttack path discovery is a link between the identiﬁcation of possible vul-
erability exploitation, attack path identiﬁcation and mitigation. A po-
ential administrator of the MITIGATE system can successfully identify
elevant attack paths under the speciﬁed settings, which is important
or critical infrastructure protection in a constantly changing dynamic
nvironment. 
. Conclusions and future work 
The use of information systems is a vital infrastructure part of various
omains including maritime supply chain. However, with supply chain
eing a dynamic domain in terms of its IT infrastructure the use of a
isk management system is necessary to identify and mitigate attacks.
n this direction, we have developed MITIGATE, a risk management sys-
em that ﬁts well in a constantly changing dynamic environment and
hat automates the process of risk assessment and mitigation. In this
ontext, we have proposed a highly parameterized cyber-attack path
iscovery method. The proposed method works as a component of the
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[  isk management system to identify attack paths that exist under certain
onditions and has been evaluated for its quality and performance using
oth synthetic data and real data supplied by the port of Valencia. Both
he quality and privacy results show that the proposed method is both
ractical and eﬀective. 
As a future work, we aim to investigate the following research direc-
ions: 
Attack mitigation. This research direction will investigate the pos-
ibility of applying recommendation methods to mitigate attacks in real
ime. In the case the administrator runs a risk assessment and identi-
es that certain vulnerabilities can be exploited and attack paths exist
ut no actions have been taken, then the attack mitigation method will
ssist by providing defence strategies. 
Attack prediction. In this step. we will investigate the use of recom-
ender system with the use of previous data from the system to predict
uture attacks. The attack predictions will be based on a combination of
nformation from vulnerabilities in assets, attack paths between assets,
he importance of the target asset and previous attack information. 
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